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Reed v. Salazar, ___F. Supp. 2d___, 2010 WL 3853218, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 129845
(D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2010).

Matt Newman

ABSTRACT
Two environmental advocacy groups challenged the decision of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) to grant operational management of the National Bison Range in
western Montana to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation.
The District Court for the District of Columbia held the Service‘s decision to classify the
management agreement as a categorical exclusion to environmental review violated the National
Environmental Policy Act. The Court held the management agreement be set aside, effectively
returning control of the National Bison Range to FWS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reed v. Salazar was decided on September 28, 2010 by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.333 The decision is the culmination of two separate but related suits
challenging the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service‘s (FWS) decision to grant administrative control
of the National Bison Range (the Range) in western Montana to the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation (CSKT). In a consolidated opinion, the court held
that the FWS violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by re-granting control of
the National Basin Range to the CSKT without first performing an environmental assessment. 334
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Reed v. Salazar, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 129845 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2010).
Id. at *55 (The dispute in this case is over the second grant of control given to the CSKT over the Range. For a
history of CSKT management of the Range: see below).
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As a result of this violation, the court returned the responsibility to manage the Bison Range to
FWS.335
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The National Bison Range Complex is a large preserve in western Montana that includes
the National Bison Range, Swan Lake, Pablo and Ninepipe National Wildlife Refuges, and the
Northwest Montana Wetland District.336 The Range was created by President Theodore
Roosevelt in 1908 to conserve populations of American bison that had been severely reduced
over the past half century.337 The range lies entirely within the borders of the Flathead
Reservation, home to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes.338
In early 2003 the CSKT contacted the Secretary of the Interior indicating an interest in
establishing an Annual Funding Agreement (AFA) for the operation and day-to-day management
of the Range.339 After a year of negotiations, the CSKT and the FWS reached an agreement,
becoming effective on March 15, 2005.340 The 2005 AFA required the CSKT to perform duties
in five areas: general Range management, biological and habitat management, fire management,
Range fence maintenance, and visitor services.341 Although day-to-day operations were given to
the CSKT and its employees, overall responsibility for the Range remained in the hands of a
FWS Manager.342
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Id. at *59.
Id. at *14.
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Id. at*15 (Annual Funding Agreements are made between federal agencies and Indian tribes pursuant to the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 and its amendments. The Act seeks to further the
policy of Tribes administering the programs, services, and administrative duties that would normally be performed
by the federal government. Id. at *5).
340
Id. at *16.
341
Id.
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One year after the 2005 AFA went into effect, the FWS Manager for the Range submitted
a report on CSKT‘s implementation of the management plan.343 The report indicated that only
forty-one percent of the duties performed by the CSKT were rated as successful.344 One month
after the FWS Manger‘s report was submitted a FWS employee issued a memorandum listing
several major deficiencies in the CSKT‘s management and operation of the Range.345
Despite the negative performance evaluations, the FWS decided to extend the 2005 AFA
into the 2007 fiscal year.346 In September 2006, seven FWS employees filed an informal
grievance, alleging the CSKT had created a hostile work environment at the Range.347 In
December, the FWS Project Leader formally recommended the FWS reassume day-to-day
control over food distribution to the animals.348 The next day the FWS regional director
requested the Secretary of the Interior to terminate the 2005 AFA and end all negotiations of
extending management by the CSKT in the future.349
On December 11, 2006, the FWS formally notified the CSKT that the 2005 AFA would
be terminated, and all negotiations for future management plans would stop immediately.350 The
termination notice listed several instances of major mismanagement by the CSKT as justification
for the decision.351 The CSKT appealed the FWS‘s decision to the Board of Indian Appeals,
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Id.
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Id. at *18.
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Id. at *19.
351
Id. (The notice cited specifically as grounds for termination: under-feeding of animals by CSKT employees;
deficient fence maintenance that led to several escapes; and the death of a cow bison that became trapped in
loose barbed wire and was stomped to death by another bison. Id. at *20).
344
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claiming the FWS was required to give notice before terminating the agreement, and that reports
by FWS employees alleging mismanagement by the CSKT were not accurate.352
While the appeal was pending, Deputy Secretary of the Interior Lynn Scarlett wrote a
letter to FWS and Bureau of Indian Affairs officials expressing disappointment in how officials
handled the termination of the 2005 AFA.353 Deputy Secretary Scarlett directed the officials to
immediately begin the process of renegotiating a new AFA for fiscal year 2007.354 After a
troubled start, negotiations were finally successful and, in June of 2008, CSKT was granted a
new AFA for fiscal years 2009-2011.355 The 2008 AFA gave the CSKT more control over
management decisions and created a new ―Refuge Leadership Team‖ consisting of officials from
the CSKT and the FWS that would collaborate on management policy.356
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Soon after the 2008 AFA became effective, two separate suits were filed challenging the
act.357 The first suit was filed by Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER), a
group of public employees which counted as it members former FWS employees who had
worked at the Range and local area ranchers whose land is adjacent to the Range.358 This group
of plaintiffs became known as the Reed plaintiffs.359 The second suit was filed by The Blue
Goose Alliance, a separate group of former and current FWS employees.360 Both suits allege
that the 2008 AFA and the process by which it was created violated several federal laws
including the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act, the Indian Self352

Id. at *21.
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Determination and Education Assistance Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).361
Both suits were filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia. All parties to the
suit filed motions for Summary Judgment under Rule 56(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.362
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S DECISION
A. Both the Reed plaintiffs and the Blue Goose Alliance plaintiffs had standing to
challenge 2008 AFA.
The FWS and the CSKT challenged the standing for both plaintiff groups to sue in
federal court. For the Reed and Blue Goose plaintiffs, the FWS claimed the parties did not have
standing to challenge the 2008 AFA because they did not suffer any ―concrete‖ and
―particularized‖ injuries from the CSKT‘s management of the Range.363 To assert standing, a
plaintiff must show:
1. That they suffered injury in fact, which is the invasion of a legally protected
interest that is:
(a) Concrete and particularized
(b) Actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;
2. That there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct at issue,
such that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged act; and
3. That it is likely, as opposed to speculative, that the injury will be redressed by
a favorable decision.364
The court noted that in environmental cases, such as this one, the injury in fact is usually
established by showing that the plaintiffs had a ―recreational or aesthetic interest in [the]

361

Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *3 (“The judgment sought should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on
file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)).
363
Id. at *34-40.
364
Id. at *32-33. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61) (emphasis added).
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particular land that [would] be adversely affected by the challenged action.‖365 Such a showing
would indicate that the injury in fact is sufficiently concrete and particularized. The court, citing
the troubled history of the CSKT‘s management of the Range, found that plaintiffs‘ aesthetic
enjoyment of the Range would be harmed by future CSKT management.366
To establish that injury is imminent, the plaintiffs only needed to show a desire to visit
the location in question.367 However, ―someday‖ intentions that lack any specification of when
the day to visit will come would not support a finding of actual or imminent injury.368
Both the Reed plaintiffs and the Blue Goose plaintiffs provided depositions and affidavits
from former FWS employees who had visited and worked in the Range and its adjoining
preserves.369 These testimonials indicated that the plaintiffs had regularly been to the Range in
the past and intended to return to the range in the near future.370 Both the FWS and the CSKT
argued that these intentions to return were too speculative in nature to establish injury in fact.371
The court soundly rejected this argument.372
Based on the history of management problems related to the CSKT and the substantial
indications that several individual plaintiffs planned to return to the Range, the court held that the
plaintiffs had met their standing requirements to challenge the 2008 AFA in federal court.373
B. The decision by the FWS to classify the 2008 AFA as a Categorical Exclusion to
environmental review was arbitrary and capricious, and thus in violation of NEPA.
The plaintiffs argued that the FWS violated NEPA when they did not conduct an
environmental analysis of the 2008 AFA before it became effective.374 The FWS claimed that
365

Id. at *35 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000)).
Id. at *39.
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Id.
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Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564).
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Id. at *38.
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the 2008 AFA could be classified as a categorical exclusion under NEPA, and thus did not
require an environmental review.375
The major working provision of NEPA is the requirement that ―all agencies of the federal
government‖ prepare and publish a detailed environmental analysis for ―major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.‖376 This analytic document is
called an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).377 A full EIS is not required if a federal
agency makes a determination through a lesser report, an Environmental Assessment (EA), that
the proposed action would not significantly affect the environment.378 The EA is ―a concise
public document‖ that makes the early indication of whether there is sufficient evidence to
justify a full EIS on the action.379
An agency does not need to prepare an EIS or an EA if it determines the action is subject
to a Categorical Exclusion (CE).380 A CE is defined as a ―category of actions which do not have
a significant impact on the human environment and which have been found to have no such
effect in procedures adopted by a federal agency in implementation of these regulations.‖381 If
an agency finds that a particular action falls within a CE the agency is still obligated to determine
if any ―extraordinary circumstances‖ would nonetheless justify an environmental analysis.382
Once a CE has been established and the agency has properly determined that no extraordinary

374

Id.
Id. at *43-44.
376
Id. at *8 (citing Found. on Econ. Trends v. Hecker, 756 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
377
Id.
378
Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D.D.C. 2006)).
379
Id. at *9 (citing Dept. of Trans. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757 (2004)).
380
Id.
381
Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §1507.3 9 (2010)).
382
Id. at *11 (citing 40 C.F.R. §1508.49, 43 C.F.R. § 46.215 (2010)).
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circumstances are applicable the decision will only be set aside by a court if the decision was
arbitrary and capricious.383
The plaintiffs argued that the decision of the FWS to classify the 2008 AFA as a CE was
arbitrary and capricious because the FWS failed to do any analysis prior to the classification. 384
The FWS argued that it was not required to conduct a new analysis because the prior analysis
which led to CE status for the previous 2005 AFA was sufficient to grant a CE for the 2008
AFA.385 The court, however, rejected this argument and determined that, the FWS had acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in light of ―substantial evidence in the record that an extraordinary
circumstance may apply‖386 In support of its rejection of the FWS argument, the court cited
substantial evidence of environmental harm during the CSKT‘s previous management of the
Range. Such examples included the finding that only forty-one percent of duties performed by
the CSKT were deemed successful; lack of electric fence maintenance by the CSKT that led to
escapes and later the trampling of a cow bison; and, evidence that the CSKT had significantly
underfed 64 bison that were awaiting transfer to another preserve.387 The court held that the
FWS decision was arbitrary and capricious because the FWS relied on its previous 2005 CE
classification for the new 2008 AFA, and this 2005 CE did not include an evaluation of the
mismanagement of the Range by the CSKT subsequent to the 2005 AFA.388
C. The proper remedy for the NEPA violation was rescission of the 2009 AFA and
reestablishment of FWS control over the Range.

383

Id. at *44 (citing Back Co. Horsemen v. Johanns, 424 F. Supp. 2d 89, 99 (D.D.C. 2006)).
Id.
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Id. at *45.
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Id. at *55.
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Id. at *50.
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After finding that the 2008 AFA was in violation of NEPA, the court next determined the
proper remedy.389 The court held that the NEPA violation in this case was governed by the
default remedy in the Administrative Procedure Act which states that a court will ―hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.‖390 The CSKT, however, argued
that rescission of the 2008 AFA was not an appropriate remedy because: (1) such a ruling would
threaten the ―long-term contractual relationship‖ the CSKT had formed with the FWS; and (2)
rescission would be major disruption to the operations and management of the Range.391 The
court however, held that it was not without discretion in issuing the proper remedy.392 The court
rejected the CSKT‘s remedy argument, stating that ―this is not a case where ‗the egg has been
scrambled and there is no apparent way to restore the status quo ante.‘‖393 The court held that
the CSKT had not shown any compelling evidence that rescission of the 2008 AFA would be
unduly disruptive to the day-to-day operation of the Range.394 In fact, the court asserted that
rescission will likely have little impact on the operations of the Range because the FWS staff
already working on the Range could easily assume the duties performed by the CSKT.395 The
court therefore held, pursuant to the APA, that the 2008 AFA should be voided, and operational
control of the Range should be given back to the FWS.396 Because the court found the Secretary
of the Interior, in approving the CE for the 2008 AFA, violated NEPA,the court determined that
setting aside the CE approval was an adequate remedy to redress the plaintiffs‘ injuries. The
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Id.
Id. (citing 5 U.S.C.A §706(2) (West 2007)).
391
Id. at *57.
392
Id. at *56.
393
Id. at *58 (citing Sugar Cane Growers Coop. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
394
Id.
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Id. at *59.
390

Page | 53

court thus dismissed the plaintiffs‘ other claims for violations of the National Wildlife Refuge
System Administration Act and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act.397
V. CONCLUSION
Depending on one‘s perspective Reed v. Salazar is either a solid victory or a striking
defeat. From the environmental law perspective the case is another example of an advocacy
group holding a federal agency accountable to NEPA and other federal rules. From an Indian
law perspective the case is yet another example of Tribes attempting to manage their own affairs
under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act only to be stopped by outside
interests. For the time being the Range is back under federal control. However, given the
importance of the Range to both sides it is doubtful that Reed v. Salazar will be the final word on
the management of the National Bison Range.

397

Id. at *60.
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